



CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR

Major General Harold E. Watson, USAF
Acting Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence
Department of the Army
Washington, D. C.

Dear General Watson:

I have read with considerable interest the appreciation and intelligence estimate included in the letter from General Lindsay to General White, which you recently sent the Director of Central Intelligence. I find myself in general agreement with General Lindsay's analyses, and am glad to note his advocacy. In his last paragraph (3) the type of activity we are undertaking in the Middle East. I might add on this point that we receive full support from the Executive Branch in our psychological "cold war" activities; ~~we~~ *we do not* ~~we~~ lack funds or personnel in this field. Our principal limitations are merely the bounds of human imagination and ingenuity *and the paucity of assets with which to work in the Middle East.*

As I suggest above, we in the Central Intelligence Agency concur generally with General Lindsay's intelligence estimates, although of course much more could be said on most of the points he raises. However, we are a little less optimistic than he is over the prospects for Kuwait, Qatar and Bahrein, and perhaps a little more optimistic over the prospects for the Sudan. On the other hand, we are inclined to believe that Libya is very vulnerable to Egyptian aggression.

The suggestion that a "cold war watch committee" be formed is one which has been seriously considered several times in the past. It is our view that a "watch committee" charged with the responsibility of watching generally developing situations on a world-wide basis would be saddled with (1) ~~a virtually impossible task and would inevitably prove ineffective.~~ We think ~~rather~~ that the framework of specific responsibilities ~~and limitations~~ under which the present watch committee functions ~~is the most effective method of operation.~~ (2)

On General Lindsay's specific policy recommendations, particularly as regards guaranteeing Israel's borders, recognizing Nasser as leader of

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~~and~~ should not be diluted

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Executive Registry

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The suggestion that a "cold war watch committee" be formed is one which has been seriously considered several times in the past. It is our view that a "watch committee" charged with the responsibility of watching generally developing situations on a world-wide basis would be saddled with the task which takes really the whole foreign policy mechanism of the Government to fulfill. We think that the framework of specific responsibilities under which the present watch committee functions to detect indications of hostilities, should not be diluted by adding such broad responsibilities of a political nature.

On General Lindsay's specific policy recommendations, particularly as regards guaranteeing Israel's borders, recognizing Nasser as leader of

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
the Arab nationalist movement, establishing a "cold war master plan", and so on, we feel that these matters lie more within the province of the Department of State, and that it would not be appropriate for us to comment on them in the present context.

Sincerely,

signed

C. P. Cabell
General, USAF
Acting Director

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SECRET

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Acting Assistant Chief of Staff,
Intelligence
Department of the Army
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As I suggest above, we in the Central Intelligence Agency concur generally with General Lindsay's intelligence estimates, although of course much more could be said on most of the points he raises. However, we are a little less optimistic than he is



On General Lindsay's specific policy recommendations, particularly as regards guaranteeing Israel's borders, recognizing Nasser as leader of the Arab nationalist movement, and so on, we feel that these matters lie more within the province of the Department of State, and that it would not be appropriate for us to comment on them in the present context.

CONCUR:

Sincerely,



W. H. C. Cabell
DEPUTY DIRECTOR INTELLIGENCE

C. P. Cabell
General, USAF
Acting Director

SEP 10 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR: GENERAL CABELL *C/C*

I have sent a copy of the attached letter from General Watson and its enclosure to the NEA Division to prepare an appropriate reply for your signature in coordination with DD/I.

JWZ
JSE

27 Aug 58

(DATE)

FORM NO. 101 REPLACES FORM 10-101
1 AUG 54 WHICH MAY BE USED.

(47)



DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF, INTELLIGENCE
UNITED STATES AIR FORCE
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

26 August 1958

Dear Mr. Dulles:

Attached is a letter and Intelligence Summary from General Lindsay, CINC Allied Air Forces, Southern Europe to Chief of Staff, USAF.

General Lindsay appears to have a sound appreciation of the Middle East situation and I tend, generally, to agree with his intelligence summary.

I would be grateful for your personal comments and any guidance you may desire to give me in connection with preparation of a reply for General White's signature.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in cursive script, reading "Harold E. Watson", is written over the typed name.

HAROLD E. WATSON
Major General, USAF
Acting Assistant Chief of Staff,
Intelligence

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Mr. Allen W. Dulles
Director
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington 25, D. C.

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